








Modality in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione









Chapters 12 and 13 of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione contain a ground-breaking investigation of the logical relations between propositions qualified as possible, impossible, or necessary.​[1]​   The discussion is often difficult, and one puzzling feature is that, half-way through his treatment (at the beginning of chapter 13), Aristotle sets down the results of his investigation in a famous table which he later amends. The question then arises: what could have led Aristotle to believe that his initial table was correct? Commentators seem to be generally agreed that his initial table is hopelessly flawed: my main aim in this article is to give that table a new interpretation whereby it emerges as perfectly correct as it stands.
Section 2 gives an overview of the scheme of logical relations to be adopted in this article, which I take to be true to the classical tradition associated with the (assertoric) square of opposition. It defines seven basic logical relations and four ‘broader’ ones. The modalities to be investigated are next introduced (with help of ‘English’ symbols) in Section 3, in which I also elaborate a ‘geometrical method’ for determining logical relations between the relevant modal propositions.
The central part of the article is Section 4. Here Aristotle’s distinction between two senses of possibility, which (following Ackrill) I call ‘one-sided’ and ‘two-sided’, is extended to the two notions of necessity and impossibility.​[2]​  And with the help of the geometrical method, the conclusion is reached that, while the two notions of necessity and impossibility are logically incompatible when both are taken as one-sided, in their two-sided meanings they are in fact equivalent. This leads to a new interpretation of Aristotle’s table at the beginning of chapter 13: my claim is that the table is perfectly correct as it stands provided all the modalities are read as two-sided.
In the light of these results, I deal (in Section 5) with three of Aristotle’s puzzles. Finally (in Section 6) I raise and discuss some philosophical issues arising out of the interpretation of modal propositions that is here offered. The appendix (Section 7) offers a ‘proof’ that, on the scheme I am here working with, the number of basic logical relations must be seven.
2. 	An overview of logical relations

I begin with a summary of the scheme of logical relations which will be presupposed in the ensuing discussion of modality in Aristotle. The scheme is meant to work only when the propositions dealt with are contingent, i.e. neither necessarily true nor necessarily false; why this restriction is needed will be explained later on in this section.
Our scheme distinguishes seven basic logical relations, as well as two different classifications into which these seven relations may be divided, yielding four broader logical relations to be defined below.
The seven basic relations that may obtain between any two contingent propositions, p and q, are defined in terms of forbidden and/or permitted combinations of truth-values,​[3]​ as follows:
(Def 1)	Equivalence. The two propositions are logically equivalent iff they cannot have opposite truth-values, i.e. if p is true q cannot be false, and conversely.
(Def 2)	Superalternation. p is in superaltern relation to q iff p cannot be true while q is false, but not conversely. 
(Def 3)	Subalternation. p is in subaltern relation to q iff q cannot be true while p is false, but not conversely.
(Def 4)	Contradiction. The two propositions are contradictories iff they cannot both be true, and cannot both be false.
(Def 5)	Contrariety. The two propositions are contraries iff they cannot both be true, but may both be false.
(Def 6)	Subcontrariety. The two propositions are subcontraries iff they cannot both be false, but may both be true.
(Def 7)	Independence (or indifference). The two propositions are logically independent (or indifferent) iff all the following four conditions hold: they may both be true, they may both be false, p may be true while q is false, and p may be false while q is true.
This scheme of seven basic logical relations has two salient features. The first is that they are jointly exhaustive: p and q must stand in one or other of these seven relations. And secondly, the seven basic relations are mutually exclusive: from the fact that p and q stand in one of these seven relations, it follows that they do not stand in any other relation amongst the remaining six. Suppose, for example, that the actual relation between p and q is that of logical independence; it will then follow that they are not contraries, not subcontraries, not contradictories, not equivalent, and so on.
It should be noted that this neat scheme works only when we are dealing with a pair of propositions both of which are contingent. To show that the scheme does not work when we introduce necessary propositions, suppose that one of our propositions, p, is necessarily true, and that the other proposition, q, is contingent. What exactly is the logical relation between p and q in this case? Clearly the two propositions can both be true, but they cannot both be false (since p cannot be false); hence they are subcontraries. However, we also notice that if q is true then p is true  (since p is necessarily true), but not conversely; hence p is in subaltern relation to q. Or again, suppose that both p and q are necessarily true. What, then, would be the logical relation between them? Two answers are equally legitimate, contrary to our requirement that the two propositions should stand in just one of the seven basic relations. First, we notice that p and q have the same truth-value; hence they are equivalent. But we can also say that they cannot both be false (since neither can) but may both be true (since both are true); hence they are subcontraries. And in general we shall find that the two propositions will stand in two different basic logical relations at once whenever we assume one or both of them to be non-contingent, i.e. either necessarily true or necessarily false, contrary to our requirement that the seven basic relations are mutually exclusive.​[4]​
Beside the seven basic logical relations that we are working with, there are four broader logical relations consisting of two pairs of opposite relations, namely (i) inconsistency and consistency, as well as what I shall call inverse inconsistency and consistency; and (ii) entailment and non-entailment.
(Def 8a) Inconsistency/consistency.	Two propositions are inconsistent iff they cannot both be true, and consistent iff they may both be true. This means that where p and q are inconsistent they may be either contraries or contradictories: the broad logical relation of inconsistency is what these two basic logical relations have in common. And on the other side, the broad logical relation of consistency is what the remaining five basic logical relations have in common: where p and q are consistent, they may be either equivalent, independent, or subcontraries, or it may be that p is in superaltern relation to q, or that p is in subaltern relation to q.
There is a special case of inconsistency and consistency which is well worth noting, and which we may call inverse inconsistency and inverse consistency. 
(Def 8b) Two propositions are inversely inconsistent iff they cannot both be false, and inversely consistent iff they may both be false. If two propositions are inversely inconsistent, they may be either contradictories or subcontraries: the broad logical relation of inverse inconsistency is what these two basic logical relations of contradiction and subcontrariety have in common. The remaining five basic logical relations are all cases of inverse consistency, i.e. in each case the two propositions may both be false.
(Def 9) Entailment/non-entailment.	p entails q iff p cannot be true while q is false; and p does  not entail q iff p may be true while q is false. If p entails q then either p is logically equivalent to q, or p is in superaltern relation to q: the broad relation of entailment is what these two basic logical relations have in common. And on the other side, the broad relation of non-entailment encompasses all the remaining five basic relations: if p does not entail q, then their exact basic relation may be that they are contradictories, contraries, subcontraries, or logically independent or it may be that p is in subaltern relation to q.
It should be noted that the two pairs of broad logical relations of consistency/ inconsistency and entailment/non-entailment are interdefinable. Thus we can define ‘p is inconsistent with q’ as ‘p entails not-q’ (or its contrapositive ‘q entails not-p’) and ‘p is consistent with q’ as ‘p does not entail not-q’. We can also define ‘p is inversely inconsistent with q’ as ‘not-p entails q’ (or its contrapositive, ‘not-q entails p’), as well as define ‘p is inversely consistent with q’ as ‘not-p does not entail q’. And conversely, the two broad relations of entailment and non-entailment are definable in terms of inconsistency and consistency, as is shown in Def 9.
Moreover, we may take either of these two pairs of broad relations (in Defs 8a and 9) and define all our seven basic relations in terms of that pair. The first seven definitions given above (Defs 1-7) are in effect stated in terms of consistency and inconsistency; but it is equally possible to define our basic relations in terms of entailment and non-entailment. Using the symbols, ‘→’ for ‘entails’ and ‘↛’ for ‘does not entail’ we may restate our definitions of the seven basic relations as follows: 
(Def 1*)  Logical equivalence:   p → q, q → p
(Def 2*)  p is in superaltern relation to q:   p → q, q ↛ p
(Def 3*)  p is in subaltern relation to q:   q → p,  p ↛ q
(Def 4*)  Contradiction:   p → ~q,  ~p → q
(Def 5*)  Contrariety:   p → ~q,  ~p ↛ q
(Def 6*)  Subcontrariety:   ~p → q,  p ↛ ~q 	
(Def 7*)  Indifference:   p ↛ q,  p ↛ ~q,  ~p ↛ q,   ~p ↛ ~q.
There remains the broader pair of logical relations of inconsistency and consistency, as well as the related pair which we have called inverse inconsistency and consistency. Their definitions in terms of entailment and non-entailment are as follows:
(Def 8a*)  Inconsistency:  p → ~q; consistency:  p ↛ ~q
(Def 8b*)  Inverse inconsistency:  ~p → q; inverse consistency:  ~p ↛ q

3.	Aristotle’s modals
Before going further, we need to get clear about two modal terms used by Aristotle in these chapters, namely dunaton (ό) and endekhomenon (ἐόIt is important to bear in mind that Aristotle regards these two terms as synonymous, or at least equivalent. Now dunaton is usually rendered ‘possible’, of which Aristotle distinguished two different senses: a broader sense (to be symbolised as P1) in which the possible includes the necessary, and a narrower, stricter sense (symbolised below as P2) in which the possible excludes the necessary. But it is difficult to think of an English word, other than ‘possible’ but having the same duality of meaning, with which to render Aristotle’s second term, endekhomenon. The traditional rendering is ‘contingent’,​[5]​ which in Ackrill’s more recent translation has been replaced by ‘admissible’.​[6]​ But it seems to me that neither of these English words is quite satisfactory. For in its familiar technical sense, ‘contingent’ always excludes  ‘necessary’, and thus cannot reflect the sense of endekhomenon corresponding to P1. And any ordinary sense of ‘admissible’ is understood as deontic, whereas Aristotle clearly intends his endekhomenon to be alethic.​[7]​   By alethic modalites is meant modalities of truth (aletheia, ̉̉́), having to do with how-things-are, in contrast to modalities of duty (deon, ́), having to do with whether certain things are permissible, forbidden, or obligatory in terms of some moral, political, social or some other normative standard.​[8]​  I therefore propose to abandon the search for a satisfactory English word for Aristotle’s endekhomenon (̉ό, and treat the latter as a variant on dunaton (ό), which does not call for a separate rendering besides ‘possible’ in its two senses of P1 and P2; but I shall nevertheless occasionally use the English term ‘contingent’ (to be symbolised C) as a variant on ‘possible’ in the narrower sense in which it excludes the necessary, i.e. in sense  P2 but never in sense P1.
For Aristotle, the central aim of chapters 12 and 13 of De Interpretatione is to investigate the proper contradictories of modally qualified propositions.​[9]​  I shall call the modally qualified propositions to be investigated ‘modals’, and the modal qualifications which they include ‘modalities’. As we have just seen, Aristotle is in effect concerned with three modalities: possibility, impossibility, and necessity. For our purpose these modalities are best regarded as propositional operators, or more precisely, as proposition-forming operators upon non-modal propositions. Thus ‘Necessarily p’ is to be spelled out as ‘It is necessary that p’, where the expression ‘It is necessary that’ serves to form a compound modal proposition of which the simpler proposition p is a part; and similarly with ‘Possibly p’ and ‘impossibly p’. 
Going back to Aristotle’s discussion in these two chapters, we find that he sets himself two specific tasks: first, to find the correct contradictory of a given modal proposition, such as ‘Possibly p’; and secondly, to determine the correct consequences of (or what is entailed by) a given modal proposition. For example, what is the correct contradictory (negation) of the modal ‘Possibly p’? Is it ‘Possibly not-p’ or ‘Not-possibly p’? And what does ‘Possibly p’ entail in terms of the other modalities? Does it, e.g., entail ‘Not necessarily p’? Our answer, as we shall soon learn, is that these two modals are subcontraries; hence following our scheme of logical relations, they are not contradictories; and neither entails the other, since equivalence, superalternation, and subalternation are all ruled out by subcontrariety.
Clearly we can achieve both of these tasks at once if we can determine the exact basic logical relation between our two modals – in the last example ‘
But how are we to determine the basic logical relations between our pair of modals? In the remainder of this section I shall outline a ‘geometrical method’ for achieving this.




Figure 1: Aristotle’s modalities
In the discussion which follows, the abbreviation umd stands for our universe of modal discourse, comprising all propositions, which in the present case is represented by the thick horizontal line ab. The segments ad and db represent, respectively, the realms of true and false propositions; the segment ac represents necessarily true propositions; ce contingent propositions (true or false); ae stands for logical possibility; and eb for the logically impossible (or necessarily false). The following notation, which appears in the above diagram, will be used:
C contingent/ly (neither necessary nor impossible)
F false/ly (treated as a modality by courtesy)​[10]​
I logically impossible/-bly, i.e. necessarily false
N necessary/-arily, i.e. necessarily true.
P1 logically possible/-bly, in the wider sense in which what is necessary is also possible.
P2 possible/-bly, in the narrower sense (=contingent/ly) in which the necessary is not possible.
T true/-uly (treated as a modality by courtesy)​[11]​
M, N​[12]​ variables which can take any of the above specific modalities as their values (including ‘true’ and ‘false’).
Now the same figure can also be used to determine the basic as well as broader logical relations that may obtain between two modals, or rather any two modalities operating on the same proposition, p. Let M p and N p be two modals, and let m and n represent the two segments on the line ab which represent M and N respectively. Then we may use the following nine rules, which correspond to the nine definitions of logical relations given earlier, for ascertaining the correct logical relation between our two modals. Rules 1-7 are for the basic logical relations, while Rules 8-9 are for the broader logical relations.
	(Rule 1) Logical equivalence. The two segments m and n coincide. Thus Cp and P2p are equivalent.
	(Rule 2) Superalternation. The segment m is included in n without coinciding. Thus Np is in superalten relation to P1p.
	(Rule 3) Subalternation. The segment n is included in m without coinciding. Thus P1p is in subaltern relation to Np.
	(Rule 4) Contradiction. The segments m and n fall outside each other (do not overlap) and together exhaust the umd. Thus P1p and Ip are contradictories.
	(Rule 5) Contrariety. The segments m and n do not overlap and together do not exhaust the UMD. Thus Np and Ip are contraries.
	(Rule 6) Subcontrariety. The segments m and n overlap without coinciding on either end, and together exhaust the umd. Thus P1p and Fp are subcontraries.	(Rule 7) Logical independence. The segments m and n overlap without coinciding on either end, and together do not exhaust the umd. Thus P2p and  Tp are logically independent.	 
	(Rule 8a) Inconsistency/consistency. The two modals are inconsistent iff their two segments do not overlap. Thus Np and Ip are inconsistent, whereas Cp and Tp are consistent. 
(Rule 8b) Inverse inconsistency/consistency. The two modals are inversely inconsistent iff their two segments taken together exhaust the umd (this does not exclude an overlap). Thus P1p and Ip are inversely inconsistent, and so are ~Np and ~Ip; but Tp and Ip are inversely consistent. 
(Rule 9) Entailment/non-entailment.  M p entails N p iff the segment m is included in, and may coincide with, the segment n. Thus Np entails Tp, but Tp does not entail Np.
	Four further rules are needed to accommodate negation, conjunction, and disjunction.	
(Rule 10)  A negated modal (with an outer negation), ~ M p, is represented by the umd minus the segment for M. Thus the segment for ~Ip is the same as the segment for P1p, which is ae.
	(We are now able to deal with our earlier example: What is the logical relation between Pp and ~Np? Taking P in sense P1, we notice that the two segments ae and cb overlap and together exhaust the umd represented by ab. Hence, by Rule 6, the two modals are subcontraries.)
	(Rule 11)  The conjunction of two modals is represented by the overlap of the two segments representing the conjuncts. Thus (using ‘&’ for ‘and’) the conjunction ‘P1p & ~Np’ is represented by the overlap of ae and cb, which is ce.
	(Rule 12)  The disjunction of two modals is represented by the sum of the two segments representing the disjuncts. Thus ‘Np v Cp’ is represented by ac plus ce, which is the segment ae.
	(Rule 13)  Modal propositions of the form M~p, i.e. modals with an inner negation, cannot be dealt with directly, but have first to be exchanged with an equivalent modal that is free from the inner negation, by making use of the following two equivalences (where ‘‘ stands for ‘is equivalent to’):
	(I)  N~p  ↔ Ip 			(first equivalence)
(II)  I~ p  ↔ Np			(second equivalence)
As for 	P1~p, it can be shown that it is equivalent to ~Np, thus:
P1~p   ↔ ~I~p		(substituting ~I for P1)
  ↔ ~Np 		(by the second equivalence)
Hence P1~p is represented by the same segment as ~Np, which, by Rule 10, is cb; so that P1~p is logically equivalent to ~Np, by Rule 1.
Note that the first equivalence is derivable from the second, and is therefore redundant. This can be shown by starting with the second equivalence and substituting ~p for p, thus
 		I~p  ↔ Np 		 	(second equivalence)
hence		I~~p ↔  N~p		(substituting ~p for p)
i.e.      		Ip  ↔ N~p			(double negation)
hence  		N~p  ↔ Ip      	 	(commutation)
which is the first equivalence.
These equivalences enable us to determine logical relations between modals with inner negation and other modals without inner negation. For example, what is the logical relation between P1p and P1~p? Using Rule 13 we have just shown that P1~p is logically equivalent to ~Np. Hence the logical relation between P1p  and  P1~p is the same as that between P1p and ~Np; hence P1p and P1~p are subcontraries (by Rule 6). Here we have made use of the following principle, which will be taken for granted in the remaining sections: namely, that if A, B, and C are three distinct propositions, and A stands in a certain logical relation r to B, and B is logically equivalent to C, then A stands in the same logical relation r to C.
4. 	Aristotle’s table of modals
In his actual discussion Aristotle seems to hesitate between uniformly adopting the wider sense of ‘possible’ (P1), and the narrower sense (P2), but finally to settle for the wider sense. This at least is the situation in the two chapters of De Interpretatione that concern us;  Aristotle does take up the meaning of possibility in his Prior Analytics, before going on to discuss the modal syllogism (which is not on my agenda), and there he uniformly adopts the narrower sense of ‘possible’.​[13]​  However, before going into details we will do well to have a closer look at this distinction, with the help of Figure 1 and the resources of the previous section.
For reasons to be explained presently I call the wider notion of possibility ‘one-sided’ and the narrower notion ‘two-sided’.​[14]​   In our symbols P1 and P2 the subscripts are partly intended to highlight the one-sidedness and the two-sidedness of the two notions which they symbolise. 
In sense P1 the possible is that which is not impossible. In this sense, the possible includes the necessary, so that being necessary entails being possible. Thus P1 p ↔ ~Ip, and Np → P1p.  The reason why I call this sense of ‘possible’ one-sided is that P1 p does not entail P1~p. In fact P1p and P1 ~p are subcontraries, so that P1p cannot be in superaltern relation to P1 ~p, nor can they be equivalent. For P1 ~p ↔ ~I~p ↔   ~Np (by Rule 13), and P1 p and  ~Np are subcontraries (by Rule 6).
Whereas in sense P2 the possible is that which is neither necessary nor impossible. In this sense the possible excludes the necessary, so that being necessary does not entail being possible. Thus P2 p ↔ ~Np & ~Ip. However, with the help of Rule 13, we can redefine P2 in terms of any one of the remaining modalities, namely either I or P1 or N. Thus 
1  P2 p ↔ ~Np & ~Ip			(as above)
2  P2 p ↔ ~I~p & ~Ip			(1, Rule 13)
(Def  10)	3  P2 p ↔ ~Ip & ~I~p			(2, commutation)
(Def  11)	4  P2 p ↔ P1 p & P1~p        	(3, substituting P1 for ~I)
5  P2 p ↔ ~I~p & ~I~~p 		(2, double negation) 
(Def 12)	6	P2 p ↔ ~Np & ~N~p 		(5, Rule 13)
The reason why I call P2  two-sided is that P2p is logically equivalent to P2 ~p. This can be proved by substituting ~p for p in any of the above definitions of 
P2 p. For example:
					1  P2 p  ↔ ~Np & ~N~p	 	(Def 12)
					2  P2~p ↔ ~N~p & ~N~~p	(1, substituting ~p for p )
	 				3  P2~p ↔ ~N~p & ~Np		(2, double negation) 
4  P2~p ↔ ~Np & ~N~p		(3, commutation)
	    			P2 p   ↔   P2~p					(1 and 4, equivalents)
P2 is thus a two-way or ambivalent possibility: from the supposition that something may be the case (in this two-sided sense) it follows that it may not be the case, and vice versa.
It will be helpful to adopt a general definition of two-sidedness and one-sidedness, since I intend later on in this section to apply this distinction to impossibility and necessity, as well as contingency. So I offer the following:
(Def 13)  A modality M is two-sided iff Mp is logically equivalent to M~p; otherwise the modality is one-sided.
And now let us turn to some of the details in Aristotle’s investigation. As was mentioned earlier, Aristotle undertakes two tasks: the first, to which he devotes chapter 12, is to establish the proper contradictory of each type of modal proposition under investigation; the second, undertaken in chapter 13, is to determine the proper ‘consequences’ that logically follow from a given modal proposition. 
With regard to proper contradictories, we should note that in a modal proposition Mp there are two places where a negation sign may be inserted: an inner negation yielding M~p and an outer negation yielding ~Mp. Now in a non-modal proposition such as ‘That man is walking’, the proposition expressed by inserting an inner negation, namely ‘That man is not walking’, does constitute a proper contradictory; but so does the proposition expressed by adding an outer negation, namely ‘It is not the case that that man is walking’; indeed we should regard these two contradictories as logically equivalent.​[15]​  Aristotle insists, however, that with modal propositions inner and outer negation make all the difference, and that it is always wrong to regard the result of inner negation as the proper contradictory. Here is what he says about the negation of ‘Possibly p’:  ‘... It seems that for the same thing it is possible both to be and not to be. For everything capable of being cut or walking is capable also of not walking or not being cut. The reason is that whatever is capable in this way is not always actual, so that the negation too will hold of it: what can walk is capable also of not walking, and what can be seen of not being seen... The negation [proper contradictory] of “possible to be”, therefore, is “not possible to be”‘ (21b 11-24). ‘For it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be: such statements [modal propositions] are not contradictories of one another. But “possible to be” and “not possible to be” never hold together, because they are opposites’ (21b 36 - 22a 1). To put it our way, Aristotle’s point here is that P1~p cannot be the proper contradictory of P1p; for, as we have established earlier, these two modals are in fact subcontraries, and so can both be true; but a pair of contradictories cannot both be true. Rather, the proper contradictory of P1p is ~P1p (by Rule 4).
In the remainder of chapter 12 (22a 4f.) Aristotle makes parallel remarks about the necessary and the impossible, which we will summarise by using our own shorthand notation. He points out that the contradictory of Np is not N~p but ~Np, and that of N~p is ~N~p.​[16]​  For, we might add, N~p ↔ Ip (by Rule 13), and Np and Ip are contraries (by Rule 5); hence Np and N~p are also contraries, and so cannot be contradictories; but Np and ~Np are proper contradictories (by Rule 4). And similarly, the proper contradictory of Ip is not I~p but ~Ip (by Rule 4). For I~p ↔ Np (by Rule 13), and Ip and Np are contraries (by Rule 5); hence Ip and I~p are also contraries, and so cannot be proper contradictories.
Aristotle’s remaining task is to determine the correct logical relations between the various modals under investigation. The discussion is carried out with the help of a table which he sets out near the beginning of chapter 13 (22a  22-31) but  later amends. 
Using our shorthand we may rewrite that table as follows:

(i)							   (ii)
1. 	Pp						1  ~Pp 
2 	~Ip						2	Ip        
				3	~Np						3	N~p






Table 1: Aristotle’s initial table of modals

The division into four quadrants is not in Aristotle but is usually added for convenience of reference. Aristotle actually has four modals in each quadrant, with a separate (second) line for the endekhomenon, which I have omitted in the belief that it is redundant,​[17]​ thus reducing the table to six lines instead of eight.​[18]​
Two questions arise about this table. How is the table structured? And in which of the two senses of ‘possible’ is the table to be read? As regards the table’s general structure, we may distinguish the horizontal dimension from the vertical one. Horizontally, we seem to be given a pair of would-be contradictories on each line, consisting of two modals with the same modality placed opposite each other: thus, on the first line, ~Pp in quadrant (ii) is intended to be the proper contradictory of Pp in quadrant (i); and on the fourth line, ~P~p in quadrant (iv) is intended to be the proper contradictory of P~p in quadrant (iii); and similarly with the remaining four lines. Now the only way to preserve the horizontal relation of contradiction in the remaining four lines is to regard the second and third modal in each quadrant as logically equivalent to the initial modal, and therefore to each other. For suppose that the second modal in quadrant (i) is merely entailed by the first modal (i.e. that the second modal is in subaltern relation to the first), and that the second modal in quadrant (ii) is also merely entailed by the first. Then it will not follow that the two modals on the second line of our table are contradictories. For it is a logical truth that if A and B are contradictories, and A entails C and B entails D, then it will not follow that C and D are also contradictories; C and D will be contradictories only if C is logically equivalent to A, and D is logically equivalent to B.​[19]​  This point follows from the simpler principle articulated at the end of Section 4, above. The correct principle, using obvious symbols, says
[(A r B) & (B ↔ C )] → A r C, 
which does not warrant anything about the logical relation of A to C when B is not equivalent to C.
Bearing this point in mind, let us see how the table fares if we read ‘possible’ in sense P1 throughout. The right-hand side of the table, i.e. quadrants (ii) and (iv), seems to be perfectly in order: both the second and the third modals in quadrant (ii) are equivalent to the first, and therefore to each other; and similarly, the three modals in quadrant (iv) are all equivalent.​[20]​  What about the left-hand side? In both quadrants (i) and quadrant (iii) the first two modals are equivalent, but the third modal in both quadrants is oddly placed. In quadrant (i), the first and second modals are equivalent, but both are in subcontrary relation to the third modal. The result is that, in the third line of the table, the desired horizontal relation of contradiction fails to obtain: ~Np is in fact in subaltern relation to N~p. And the situation is exactly parallel in quadrant (iii); so that here again (in the sixth line of our table) the desired horizontal relation of contradiction fails to obtain: ~N~p in subaltern relation to Np, and so the two modals are not contradictories.​[21]​ 
It is not difficult to see how Table 1 can be rectified. Since the right-hand side is perfectly in order we need only ask, with regard to the necessity modals on that side of the table, what their proper contradictories should be in accordance with the conclusions which Aristotle has already established in chapter 12. The proper contradictory of N~p on the third line of the table is ~N~p, which does not appear on the same line but is misplaced on the sixth line of the table; and the proper contradictory of Np on the sixth line is ~Np, which has been misplaced on the third line. So all we have to do, in order to get a perfect table for P1, is to transpose these two modals on the left-hand side, by substituting ~N~p for ~Np in quadrant (i), and making the converse substitution in quadrant (iii).
Aristotle does eventually amend his initial table in exactly this way, and argues the point in some detail as regards the proper necessity modal in quadrant (i) of the table; he does not explicitly say that he would make the converse substitution in quadrant (iii), but we may safely assume that he would wish to do so. Thus he writes: ‘But perhaps it is impossible for the contradictories in the case of the necessary to be placed thus [i.e. as in quadrant (i)]? For the necessary to be is possible to be... However, from “possible to be” follows “not impossible to be” and from this [according to quadrant (i)] follows “not necessary to be”; with the result that the necessary to be is not necessary to be – which is absurd.​[22]​..However, it is not “necessary to be” nor yet “necessary not to be” that follows from “possible to be”. For with this both may happen, but whichever of the others is true these will no longer be true; for it is at the same time possible to be and not to be, but if it is necessary to be or not to be [then] it will not be possible for both. It remains, therefore, for “not necessary not to be” to follow from [or rather be equivalent to] “possible to be”...’ (22b 10-22) 
Aristotle’s very terse argument here may, I think, be spelled out as follows. Our problem is to find the correct necessity modal that really follows from (or is equivalent to) Pp. Now there are four possible necessity modals: Np, ~Np, N~p, and ~N~p. In the first half of the quoted passage Aristotle had argued that ~Np cannot be what we are after: for if Np → Pp and Pp → ~Np, in accordance with quadrant (i), then Np → ~Np, which is absurd. In the second half he goes on to argue that neither Np nor N~p can follow from (or be equivalent to) Pp. For Pp and P~p can both be true (they are consistent). But if Pp is true and Pp entails (or is equivalent to) Np, then Np is true, and if Np is true then P~p cannot be true (they are in fact contradictories). And again, if Pp is true and Pp entails (or is equivalent to) N~p, then N~p is true; but if N~p is true then Pp cannot be true (they are in fact contradictories). Hence if either Np or N~p is true then Pp and P~p cannot both be true. Thus Aristotle has eliminated the three necessity modals, ~Np, Np and N~p, leaving the remaining one, ~N~p, as the only necessity modal that follows from (or is equivalent to) P1p.
Yet oddly enough, Aristotle could have dispensed with these long-winded arguments by simply asking: What is the proper contradictory of N~p in quadrant (ii) of our table? The answer, which he had already established in chapter 12, is ~N~p, and that it is this necessity modal (and no other) that should appear in quadrant (i) on the same line.
Aristotle also offers a diagnosis as to why the error regarding the necessity modal in quadrant (i), and presumably in quadrant (iii), was committed in the first place. He points out that there is indeed a logical link between impossibility and necessity, but that it is wrong to regard the two notions as interchangeable: the correct equivalence is between ‘impossible’ and ‘necessarily not’, or between ‘impossibly not’ and ‘necessary’.​[23]​  Thus we find him writing two paragraphs earlier:  ‘But what about the necessary? Evidently things are different here... For [looking at the third line of our table] the negation [contradictory] of “necessary not to be” is not “not necessary to be”. For both may be true at the same time, since the necessary not to be is not necessary to be.​[24]​  The reason why these [namely, ~Np and N~p] do not follow in the same way as the others [in our shortened table, the two modalities ~Ip and Ip] is that it is [only] when applied in a contrary [inverse] way that “impossible” and “necessary” have the same force [are interchangeable]. For if it is impossible to be [then] it is necessary for this ... not to be; and if it is impossible not to be [then] it is necessary for this to be. Thus ... “necessary” and “impossible” do signify the same but (as we said) when applied conversely [inversely]’ (22a 37– b 9). Aristotle is thus suggesting that the move from  ~Ip to ~Np in quadrant (i), and that from ~I~p to ~N~p in quadrant (iii), are both motivated by the mistaken belief that the impossible and the necessary may be directly (rather than inversely) interchanged.
Aristotle does not work out a revised table that incorporates his envisaged amendments to quadrants (i) and (iii); but there is no doubt that with these two amendments we get a perfect table for P1, which is our Table 2. In the revised table the implicit goals of Table 1 are fully achieved. Horizontally, each of the six lines contains a pair of proper contradictories with the same modality; and vertically, each quadrant contains three modals all of which are equivalent.


(i)							   (ii)
1. 	P1p						1  ~P1p 
2 	~Ip						2	Ip        
				3	~N~p					3	N~p






Table 2: Aristotle’s amended table for P1

	What about P2? Prima facie Aristotle does not work out a separate table for two-sided possibility, but it is instructive to attempt to do so on his behalf. Our table would have to mirror Table 2, and consist of four quadrants each containing three equivalent modals in the order possible – impossible-- necessary. The result is our Table 3. To get quadrant (i) we use our two definitions of P2 in terms of impossibility and necessity (Defs 10 and 12), which yield ‘~Ip & ~I~p’ and ‘~Np & ~N~p’. Next we reason that, since P2 is a two-sided modality, P2p and P2~p are equivalent; hence their equivalents in terms of impossibility and necessity are the same, which is what we find when we compare lines 2-3 in quadrant (iii) with their counterparts in quadrant (i). This completes the left-hand side of the table. To work out the right-hand side for lines 2-3 in both quadrants, we make use of one of De Morgan’s Theorems according to which the negation of ‘A v B’  is equivalent to ‘~A & ~B’. 
This yields ‘Ip v I~p’ and ‘Np v N~p’ for lines 2-3 in quadrant (ii); and since ~P2~p is equivalent to ~P2p, the same disjunctive modals also appear in quadrant (iv), lines 2-3.


(i)							   (ii)
1. 	P2p						1  ~P2p 
2 	~Ip & ~I~p			2	Ip v I~p 
				3	~Np & ~N~p		3	Np v N~p

(iii)						   (iv)
				1	P2~p						1	~P2~p
2	~Ip & ~I~p			2	Ip v I~p
3	~Np &	~N~p		3	 Np v N~p

Table 3: A parallel table for P2

In Table 3, as in Table 2, each of the four quadrants contains three equivalent modals. But since P2 p is equivalent to P2~p, by virtue of the fact that P2  is a two-sided modality, it follows that all the six modals on the left-hand side are in fact equivalent; and for similar reasons, all the six modals on the right-hand side of the table are also equivalent. So that each of the six modals on the one side is in contradictory relation to each of the six modals on the other.
However, Table 3 can be simplified by introducing new, two-sided senses for both impossibility and necessity. But first let us bear in mind that we have so far been using the notions of impossibility and necessity as one-sided modalities. For by our definition of one-sidedness and two-sidedness (Def 13), since Ip and I~p are not equivalent (they are in fact contraries), the impossibility that we have so far been working with is a one-sided modality, which we will henceforth symbolise as ‘I1’. Similarly, since Np and N~p are not equivalent (they are in fact contraries), our necessity so far has been a one-sided modality, which will henceforth be symbolised as ‘N1’. We can now introduce a two-sided sense for both the impossible and the necessary as follows.
(Def 14)	1  I2p	↔  I1p v I1~p
				2  I2p	↔  I1p v N1p			(1, by Rule 13)
Substituting ~p for p in (2), we get
				3  I2~p	↔  I1~p v N1~p
				4  I2~p	↔  N1~p v I1~p		(3, commutation)
				5  I2~p	↔  I1p v N1p			(4, by Rule 13)
				6  I2p	↔  I2~p					(2, 5, equivalent)
So by Def 13, I2 is a two-sided modality.
(Def 15)	1  N2p  ↔  N1p v N1~p
				2  N2p  ↔  N1p v I1p			(1, by Rule 13)
				3  N2p  ↔  I1p v N1p			(2, commutation)

Here again we can establish that N2 is two-sided by substituting ~p for p in any of the above three equivalences, as we did with I2. But there is another unexpected result, namely that I2p and N2p turn out to be logically equivalent!  This is proved by the fact that they are both equivalent to the same thing:  I2p is equivalent to ‘I1p v N1p’ (step 2, against Def 14, above), but so too is N2p (step 3, against Def 15 above). Figure 2 depicts the distinction between one-sided and two-sided modalities applied across the board.


Figure 2: One-sided and two-sided modalities
We are now ready for our simplified Table 4, which we get by using two-sided modalities throughout, and substituting (in lines 2-3 and 5-6 of Table 3) I2 and N2 equivalents for the conjunctions or disjunctions of one-sided modalities in  Table 3. 

(i)							   (ii)
1. 	P2p (↔ C2 p)		1  ~P2p 
2 	~I2p 						2	I2p 
				3	~N2p					3	N2~p (↔ N2p)






Table 4: Two-sided modalities

Of course Table 4 is only Table 3 rewritten in accordance with Defs 14 and 15, and therefore has the same overall structure as the latter. Here again on each side the six modals are all equivalent, and each of the six modals on the one side is in contradictory relation to each of the six on the other. 
And now we are in for a greater surprise; for Table 4 is an exact replica of Table 1 when the latter is taken to be about two-sided modalities throughout. It seems, then, that in chapter 13 Aristotle started off by sketching a perfectly correct table for two-sided modalities, but then realised that this scheme could not accommodate the entailment from Np to Pp, which he was reluctant to give up. He then argued for two amendments leading to Table 2, which is perfect for one-sided modalities across the board. Whether his reasons for amending the initial table the way he did were compelling is a theme that will be taken up in the next section. My main claim, so far, is that, on my interpretation, chapter 13 contains two faultless tables: one for one-sided modalities (Table 2), and one for two-sided modalities (Table 1, read as Table 4).
I will end this section with a few remarks on contingency. Earlier (in Section 4) I said that I would be using the English word ‘contingent’ as a variant on ‘possible’ in its two-sided (but not in its one-sided) sense. On this scheme, contingency is a two-sided modality which we should symbolise as ‘C2’. The subscript is needed in order to distinguish between this sense and a stricter narrower sense of contingency which we will symbolise as ‘C1’ and define as follows 
(Def 16)		C1p  ↔  C2 p & Tp
It is clear that, by Def 13, C1 is a one-sided modality; for C1 p and C1~p are not equivalent. This can be proved by substituting ~p for p in Def 16. Thus:			

1 C1p	↔	  C2p & Tp 			(Def 16)
2 C1~p	↔	  C2~p & T~p		(Substituting ~p for p)
					3 C1~p	↔  C2 p & Fp			(since C2 p and C2~p are equivalent)

Now, by Rule 5, ‘C2p & Tp’ and ‘C2 p & Fp’ are contraries; hence their equivalents, C1p and C1~p are also contraries, and so are not equivalent; hence (by Def 13) C1 is a one-sided modality.






I have isolated for separate treatment three puzzles which Aristotle articulates in the course of chapter 13, and which he seems to regard as arguments in favour of sticking to P1 rather than P2 , and more generally, for adhering to the one-sided system for P, I and N against the two-sided system. I will first restate and comment on these arguments individually, and then make a few remarks in assessment of their joint weight or swaying power. 
First puzzle. Aristotle says: ‘... The necessary to be is possible to be. (Otherwise the negation will follow, since it is necessary either to affirm or deny it; and then, if it is not possible to be, [then] it is impossible to be; so the necessary to be is impossible to be -- which is absurd.)’ (22b 11-14). And again: ‘One might raise the question whether “possible to be” follows from “necessary to be”. For if it does not follow [then] the contradictory will follow, “not possible to be” – or if one were to deny that this is the contradictory [then] one must say that “possible not to be” is; both of which are false of “necessary to be”‘ (22b 29-32).	
Aristotle has two arguments here, each of which is a reductio ad absurdum, to prove that Np → Pp. We need not deal separately with the second reductio, which is really an ad hominem argument levelled against someone who believes falsely that the proper contradictory of Pp is P~p. The first reductio may be restated as follows:
Suppose that the negation of our thesis were true, that is
1  Np ↛ Pp	 
then	 				2  Np → ~Pp
that is				3  Np →  Ip
which is absurd, since Np and Ip are contraries (by Rule 5).
	Comment. As Ackrill points out, the step from (1) to (2) is invalid:​[25]​  from the supposition that Np does not entail Pp it does not follow that Np entails the contradictory of Pp, which is ~Pp (or Ip). What does follow, rather, is that
						2*  Np and ~Pp are consistent
that is				3*  Np and Ip are consistent
But (3*) is still absurd: Np and Ip cannot be consistent since they are in fact contraries (by Rule 5). So when we rectify the invalid step from (1) to (2) by substituting (2*) for (2) and concluding with (3*), the absurdity does not disappear. The above reductio is in fact perfectly correct provided we read all the three propositions (1, 2*, 3*) in terms of N1 P1 and I1; and what it shows is that, within the one-sided system, Np → Pp is undeniable. But this does not constitute a reason for rejecting the two-sided system, in which Np → Pp turns out to be false, that is N2p ↛ P2p. Indeed, the reader can easily ascertain, with the aid of Figure 2 and the resources of Section 4, that of the four putative entailments from necessity to possibility, only N1p → P1p is valid; the remaining three are all invalid: thus N1p ↛ P2p, N2p ↛ P1p, and N2p ↛ P2p. 
Second puzzle. In Aristotle’s own words this reads: ‘The necessary to be 
is possible to be... However, from “possible to be” follows “not impossible to be”, and from this follows [according to Table 1] “not necessary to be”, with the result that the necessary to be is not necessary to be – which is absurd’ (22b 11-17). Aristotle is here asserting Np → Pp and deriving an absurdity if we accept Table 1, quadrant (i). We may restate the argument as follows:
                    1  Np → Pp		(taken to be a valid entailment)
                    2  Pp → ~Ip		(contradictories)
                    3  ~Ip → ~Np	(by Table 1)
               p → ~Np 	(by the transitivity of entailment)
which is absurd.
Comments. As was noted with the first puzzle, premiss (1) is true for P1 and N1 only. Premiss (2) is true for P1/ I1 as well as for P2/I2. But premiss (3) is false for I1/N1; it is true only if it is read in terms of N2 and I2, since I2p and N2p are in fact equivalent (by Defs 14-15). Thus we cannot secure uniform senses of P, I and N in which all the three entailments in the premisses hold; and so the paradoxical conclusion does not follow.
Third puzzle. This is not explicitly stated by Aristotle, but it may easily be gleaned from certain things that he says in chapter 13. He does, as we have seen, want to uphold the entailment from necessity to possibility. He also says, or seems to say, at times, that what is possible to be is also possible not to be: that (in Ackrill’s translation) ‘it is at the same time possible to be and not to be’, or (in Edghill’s translation of the same words) ‘if a thing may be it may also not be’ (22b 20). From which it follows that what is necessary to be may possibly not be, which is absurd. We may restate the argument as follows:
		      1  Np → Pp	     (taken to be a valid entailment)
		      2  Pp → P~p	     (generally agreed)
p → P~p	     (by the transitivity of entailment)
this is absurd.
Comments. Premiss (1), as already noted, is true for N1 and P1 only, while premiss (2) is true for P2 only. Hence we cannot plug in the same sense of ‘possible’ to secure the two entailments required for the conclusion to follow: P1 (with N1) secures the first but not the second entailment, P2 the second but not the first.




I can think of three philosophical issues, which I will outline very briefly as I have no very settled views on any of them.
(i) Radical conventionalism. My treatment commits me to the view that all the modals we have been dealing with are to be treated as contingent propositions. This follows from the restriction of the scheme of logical relations that I have been employing to contingent propositions. So a modal proposition such as Np, or rather N1p, is to be regarded as saying that p is necessarily true, but that the whole modal is itself contingent. I am thus committed to the view that no proposition is necessarily necessary, which (stated in our notation) says ~NNp. This is tantamount to an axiom, called C13 by C. I. Lewis, which (stated in our notation) says:
		C13   PPp
That the two axioms are equivalent can be established by substituting ~p for p in C13, thus:
		~PP~p ↔ ~~N~~N~~p ↔NNp
Is this an unalloyed defect? According to Hughes and Cresswell,​[26]​ citing the authority of C.I. Lewis, C13 is independent of each of the systems S1–S3, but incompatible with S4 and S5. Of special interest here is the system S7, which is S3 + C13. On this point I can do no better than quote further from Hughes & Cresswell:​[27]​  ‘S3 ... is neutral between two conflicting views: (a) the one reflected in S7, that no propositions are necessarily necessary (or that every proposition is possibly possible), and (b) the one reflected in S4, that if a proposition is necessary it is necessarily necessary. But although S3 does not commit us to holding either of these views it does commit us to holding that one of them is correct... S3 requires that either view (a) or view (b) is correct, but does not tell us which is correct. (And there need be no harm in this omission, for we may well be hesitating between (a) and (b) and want a logic which says: “The following are truths about logical necessity whichever of these two views is the correct one”.)’
The question, then, comes to whether it is S7 or S4 that is correct, and there seems to be no general agreement that S7 is incorrect.
(ii) A logic of predicates? But if the above feature of my treatment is considered too hard to swallow, we can resort to a reconstruction according to which what we have been concerned with is not logical relations between propositions, but really logical relations between the modalities P, I, and N, which strictly speaking are modal predicates (or properties). So when we say that the proposition Np entails the proposition Pp, what we should be taken to mean is that the property of being necessary entails the property of being possible. The envisaged reconstruction need not be worked out in detail. All we need is an over-arching proviso, along roughly the following lines:  ‘Whenever I say of two modal propositions Mp and Np that they are in a certain logical relation r, take me as saying that the modal predicates M and N are in the appropriate corresponding logical relation r*’. I say ‘the corresponding logical relation R*’ because the envisaged reconstruction would require an appropriate rewording of our definitions of the logical relations. The logical relation of ‘That surface is red all over’ and ‘That surface is blue all over’ is that of contrariety, by which we mean that the two propositions cannot both be true but may both be false. The logical relation between being red (all over) and being blue (all over) is again that of contrariety, but understood somewhat differently: it is that the two properties cannot both apply but may both fail to apply. Essentially the rewording required for the new definitions consists in replacing talk of ‘true’/’false’ by talk of ‘apply’/’do not apply’.

(iii) No two-sided modalities? The two-sided senses of N and I which I have introduced may sound suspect. Let us set them aside and concentrate on P. Is it really the case that ‘possibility’ has a narrower, two-sided sense, as well as the wider, one-sided sense which some writers have called ‘possibility proper’? It has been suggested to me that there is only one proper sense of ‘possible’, namely the one I have called one-sided; and that the so-called narrower or two-sided sense is the result of conflating semantics with pragmatics. Let us take an example from a non-modal context. When I say ‘Some men are mortal’ I may be taken to imply that ‘Some men are not mortal’, and vice versa; and this may lead someone to suggest that there is an entailment both ways, so that our two utterances are to be regarded as logically equivalent. But we know better: the correct relation between the two propositions is that of subcontrariety. How, then, are we to explain the inclination to regard them as equivalent?  Here we need to distinguish carefully between a proposition and an assertion, the latter being a much richer notion. As John Searle once put it, ‘an assertion is a (very special kind of) commitment to the truth of a proposition’.​[28]​  A proposition can be looked upon as something which is true or false, regardless of whether it is in fact asserted. But when I assert a proposition, p, I commit myself to it; and if I assert it in a public setting I implicitly convey to my audience that I claim to know that p, or at least that I believe that p. Moreover, my assertion standardly or usually has a point or a purpose; it may be the case, for example, that some of the things I say are new to some of my audience, so that the point or purpose of my assertions is to impart or share my knowledge. But the most relevant feature of assertion is that what I assert should comply with, or closely reflect, what I  know or believe; thus I should badly mislead my audience if, knowing that all men are mortal, I assert ‘Some men are mortal’. What is the point of proclaiming that some men are mortal when I know or believe that all men are mortal? It must be -- so it is felt -- that I do not believe that all men are mortal, that, in other words, I believe that some men are not mortal. Hence in asserting ‘Some men are mortal’, I imply (in a special sense of ‘imply’ which applies to speakers rather than what they say) that some men are not mortal. But this is conversational implicature, which has to do with the act of asserting rather than the relation of one proposition to another.​[29]​  And the suggestion about two-sided possibility can be explained along the similar lines. It is not that ‘possible’ has a distinct two-sided sense: rather in asserting that so-and-so is possible, I imply (or obliquely convey my belief) that not-so-and-so is also possible, though I do not say so in so many words. So the two-sided sense of possibility (according to this suggestion) is not on a par with the one-sided sense.​[30]​  Logically there is only the one-sided sense; P1~p does not logically follow from P1p but is conversationally implicated by the latter when the proposition P1p is asserted. 
If this view is correct, then the relation between P1p and P2p is not quite what I have taken it to be, namely that P2p is in superaltern relation to P1p. Rather P1p conversationally implicates P1~p, and so P1~p  implicates P1p.  And since P2p is equivalent to the conjunction of P1p and P1~p, it follows (by Def 11) that P2p is in mutual implicature with P2~p, rather than the two being logically equivalent.​[31]​	

7. 	Appendix: Why just seven?
That there are just seven basic relations is not an arbitrary claim, but something that can be deduced from the fact that we have restricted our field to contingent propositions, i.e. ones that are neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.​[32]​  Now, given any two contingent propositions, p and q, and their negations, ~p and ~q, we have four possible entailments and their corresponding negations, i.e. four possible non-entailments. We will give each of these eight items a circled number and set them out as follows: 
	p → q,				p → ~q,				~p → q,				~p →~q.
	p ↛ q,				p ↛ ~q,				~p ↛ q,				~p ↛~q.
The four entailments shown in the top row, taken two at a time, yield six combinations; but the fact that both p and q are contingent dictates that only two of these combinations are admissible; the remaining four are excluded for the following reasons:
(i)	 and  are excluded as inconsistent; for if both entailments hold then p will be necessarily false. Hence  entails the negation of , which is ; and  entails the negation of , which is . (Here and in the remaining exclusions we are making use of Def 8a* above: to say that  and  are inconsistent is to say that → ~, which is ; and similarly with the remaining inconsistencies.)
(ii)	 and  are inconsistent; for if both entailments hold then ~p will be necessarily false. Hence  entails the negation of , which is ; and  entails the negation of , which is .
(iii)	 and  are inconsistent; for if both entailments hold then q will be necessarily true. Hence  entails the negation of , which is ; and  entails the negation of , which is .
(iv)	 and  are inconsistent; for if both entailments hold then ~q will be necessarily true. Hence  entails the negation of , which is ; and   entails the negation of , which is .
Thus only two pairs out of the four entailments (top row) are consistent, namely (a)  and , and (b)  and ; whereas all the four non-entailments (bottom row) are consistent.
Now the seven basic relations recognised in our scheme are the only possible combinations of the above eight conditions (the four entailments and the four non-entailments), taken four at a time, while observing the above exclusions (indeed this point constitutes our ultimate reason for calling them ‘basic’​[33]​). The result, which is set out in the following table, is that all our basic relations are now defined in terms of the broader relations of entailment and non-entailment.









The conditions listed as redundant are unnecessary because they are entailed by the corresponding defining conditions. Thus in the case of equivalence, the conditions  and  are redundant because they are entailed by the defining conditions,  and ; and  entails , and  entails , as we have seen under restrictions (i) and (ii) above.
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^1	  I am ignoring for the time being a fourth modality discussed by Aristotle which is usually translated as the contingent (to.endekhomenon) because I regard it as logically redundant.  The point will be argued for in Section 3.
^2	  The division is also extended to the ‘contingent’ (as this word is used in English) but in a different way, as will be noted in Section 4.
^3	  The following definitions are in fact spelled out in terms of the broader logical relations of inconsistency and consistency: the former forbids a combination of two truth values, the latter permits such a combination.
^4	  It was argued some years ago by A. J. Baker (1977, passim) that it is possible to include non-contingent propositions in this scheme by increasing the total number of basic logical relations from seven to fifteen (or sixteen), and that the extended scheme would preserve our two requirements, viz. that the relations should be both jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The extended scheme, however, is not free from difficulties: according to Baker, all necessarily true propositions are equivalent (in a sense of ‘equivalent’ which is different from the sense in which two contingent propositions may be equivalent), and all necessarily false propositions are equivalent (in yet another sense of ‘equivalent’), so that we have three distinct logical relations of equivalence. Other counter-intuitive results are: that any necessary proposition is in subaltern relation to any contingent proposition, and that any necessarily false proposition is in superaltern relation to any contingent proposition; which would give rise to two distinct logical relations of subalternation as well as two distinct logical relations of superalternation. Fortunately, I do not need Baker’s extended scheme for the purpose of the present article.
^5	  Adopted, inter alios, by Edghill (1928).
^6	  Ackrill (1963), De Int. 12-13, and Notes thereto.
^7	  Contrast Ackrill (1963), Notes, p.149.
^8	  Cf. von Wright (1957), p.58.
^9	  Whitaker (1996) convincingly argues that the traditional title ‘De Interpretatione’ (ὶ ‘ίς, peri hermēneias) ‘should be rejected as spurious’, and suggests that a more appropriate title would have been ‘On the Contradictory Pair’ (ὶ ἀάς, peri antiphaseōs), since ‘its central subject is an analysis of contradictory pairs of assertions, considered as relevant to dialectic’ (ibid., p.7). Incidentally, Whitaker’s use of the term ‘assertions’ here and everywhere in his book is unfortunate; I would have preferred ‘propositions’. For Aristotle’s task is to determine the logical relations between pairs of modal propositions, and these need not be asserted   To say that A is in a certain logical relation to B does not require asserting either A or B, and is non-committal about the truth value of either proposition. A proposition can occur unasserted in other contexts as well; for example, when it figures as the antecedent of a conditional, or as one of the disjuncts in a disjunction; in these cases the whole conditional may be asserted but not the antecedent, or the whole disjunction may be asserted but not the disjuncts. Cf. Geach (1972), chapter 8.
^10	  It is worth noting that at one point (De Int.12, 22a 13) Aristotle does list ‘true’–’not-true’ as one of the contradictory pairs of modalities under investigation. In the history of logic this may well be the first instance of the treatment of truth and falsity as  quasi-modal notions; cf.Kneale & Kneale (1962), 83.
^11	  See note 9.
^12	  To be read as ‘French Script em’ and ‘French Script en’.
^13	   Aristotle writes: ‘I use the terms "to be possible" and "the possible" of that which is not necessary but, being assumed, results in nothing impossible’, which is clearly the narrower sense of ‘possible’ (Prior Analytics, I.13: 32a17-19). In his actual discussion of the modal syllogism he always uses ‘possible’ (endekhomenon) in the narrower sense when occurring in a premiss, but when occurring in a conclusion it is sometimes used in the wider sense, and when this is so Aristotle always states the fact. (Cf. Kneale & Kneale, p.85).
^14	  Here I follow Ackrill (1963); see p.151.
^15	  Our example is a singular assertoric (non-modal) proposition. The case is of course different with other types of assertoric propositions, such as the traditional particular affirmative, e.g. ‘Some men are selfish’, where the insertion of an inner negation will yield  ‘Some men are not selfish’, which is the subcontrary of our initial proposition. The proper contradictory requires an outer negation and is expressed by ‘It is not the case that some men are selfish’, i.e. ‘No man is selfish’. Aristotle, however, does not have the distinction between inner and outer negation, but has a theory according to which all contradictories are formed through what we call inner negation. The theory, which need not concern us here, is carefully reconstructed by Whitaker (1996), passim.
^16	  These remarks about modals involving necessity (at 22a 4-6) are worth noting, since, as will be seen in a moment, they are inconsistent with what Aristotle says in the next chapter in Table 1, lines 3 and 6 (at 22a  27, 31); however, the error is eventually rectified in his amended table (Table 2).
^17	  The point was argued in Section 3.
^18	   I know of two commentators who have done the same: the mediaeval philosopher Averroes (see Butterworth, tr., 1983, p.172), and more recently Bluck (1963, p.215).
^19	  To illustrate this point with a schematic example, suppose A = p, B = ~p, C = p v q, and D = ~ p v q, then it is clear that, although A entails C and B entails D (by the rule of Addition, or Vel Introduction), the contradiction between A and B does not pass on to C and D, which are consistent and can both be true if q is true. Aristotle is not clear about this point. He makes it sound as if the mere ‘implications’ (or ‘consequences’) of the individual modals forming a pair of proper contradictories will yield another contradictory pair. In his detailed discussion of logical relations involved in Table 1, he speaks of the second or the third modal in each quadrant as ‘following from’ or purporting to ‘follow from’ the first; see chapter 13, 22a 14-35. Hintikka (1962) has suggested that in chapter 13 the verb akolouthein (ἀîwhich is usually taken to denote logical consequence (and translated by, e.g. Ackrill, as ‘to follow’) should sometimes be taken to denote logical equivalence, rather than one-way entailment; it seems to me that Hintikka is right as regards the intended structure of Table 1; but as we shall see in a moment Aristotle eventually replaces Table 1 with Table 2 in order to achieve that structure. However, Hintikka also claims that, as used by Aristotle in chapters 12 and 13, the same verb  sometimes denotesmere logical compatibility (or consistency) -- a suggestion which I find very implausible. For a detailed rebuttal of Hintikka’s interpretation, see Bluck (1963). See also note 22 below.
^20	  By now the reader should be able to determine the logical relation between any pair of modals without being given the exact recipe (in terms of the Rules given in Section 3) in each instance.
^21	  Whitaker (1996, p.162 f.) holds that, with regard to possibility, Table 1 is to be read in a mixed way: the right-hand side, i.e. quadrants (ii) and (iv), is to be read in terms of P1, whereas the left-hand side is to be read in terms of P2. However, such an interpretation is far more incoherent than the one, just discussed, which we get by plugging in P1 throughout. For, on Whitaker’s scheme, all but the second and the fifth lines of the table would fail to preserve the desired horizontal relation of contradiction. In quadrants (i) and (ii), first line, P2 p and ~P1p are contraries; and, on the third line, ~Np is in subaltern relation to Ip. And the ‘horizontal’ situation is exactly parallel for quadrants (iii) and (iv): on the fourth line the logical relation is that of contrariety, and on the sixth line ~N~p is in subaltern relation to Np. As well, there would be a great asymmetry between the left-hand and the right-hand sides as regards the vertical relations. For whereas in quadrant (ii) all the three modals are equivalent; in quadrant (i) both the second and the third modals are in subaltern relation to the first, and the relation between the second and the third modals is that of subcontrariety. And the ‘vertical’ situation is exactly parallel for quadrant (iii). Readers can verify my results by using the resources of Section 4 in conjunction with Figure 2.
^22	   Hintikka does not discuss this last argument. But the occurrence of akolouthein (ἀî in Aristotle’s statement of the argument tells against Hintikka’s claim that the verb denotes logical compatibility rather than entailment (or logical consequence). Plainly the argument goes through only if we regard it as a series of entailments: Np entails Pp, Pp entails ~Ip, and ~Ip entails ~Np; therefore, Np entails ~Np. The conclusion is valid because entailment is a transitive relation; but if we substitute ‘is compatible with’ for ‘entails’ throughout, the conclusion will not follow, because logical compatibility is a non-transitive relation. Cf . Bluck (1963), p.218. See also note 19 above.
^23	   As we have noted in Section 3, under Rule 13.
^24	  As we have noted above, ~Np is in subaltern relation to N~p (and so they can both be true), which is the same as saying, with Aristotle here, that ‘the necessary not to be is not necessary to be’, i.e. that N~p entails ~Np (or more precisely, the former is in superaltern relation to the latter). 
^25	  Ackrill (1962), Notes, p.152.
^26	  Hughes & Cresswell (1968), pp.267-70; cf. Lewis & Langford (1959), p.497. I owe this reference to Lloyd Humberstone.
^27	  ibid., p270.
^28	  Searle (1969), p.29.
^29	  Cf. Grice (1989), chs. 1-7.
^30	  Cf. Levinson (1983), pp.140-41, and Gazdar (1979), pp.48-52.
^31	   A somewhat similar conclusion was reached by Der Auwera (1996, passim) via  a very different route.
^32	   I owe the idea of a proof along the following lines to the late T.A. Rose of Sydney University.
^33	   Perhaps I should point out that the term ‘basic’ is not here being used in the sense of ‘primitive’ or ‘taken as undefined’; for it will be obvious that I have in fact defined each of the basic logical relations in two ways: in terms of inconsistency/consistency, and in terms of entailment/non-entailment.
^34	 I am grateful to Dirk Baltzly, Monima Chadha, and particularly Lloyd Humberstone, for their encouragement and for many fruitful discussions while this article was being written.
